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ABSTRACT
Biotechnology is about to spill the banks of federal regulation. New genetic
engineering techniques like CRISPR-Cas9 promise revolutionary breakthroughs in
medicine, agriculture, andpublic health-butthose techniqueswould not be regulated
under the terms ofthe CoordinatedFrameworkfor Regulation ofBiotechnology. This
revolutionary moment in biotechnology offers an opportunity to correct the flaws in
the framework, which was hastily patched together at the advent of the technology.
The framework has never captured all relevant technologies, has never satisfied the
public that risk is being effectively managed, and has never been accessible to small
companies andpublicly-funded labs that increasinglyarepositioned to make radical,
lfe-saving innovations. This Article offers a proposalfor new legislation that would
reshape biotechnology regulationto better meet these goals. Key reforms include tying
regulation to risk rather than technology category; consolidating agency review;
capturingdistinctregulatoryexpertise through inter-agency consultations;creating a
clearinghouseto help guide applicantsand disseminate information; setting up more
comprehensive monitoring of environmental effects; andprovidingfederal leadership
to fill key data gaps and address socio-economic impacts.

INTRODUCTION
The Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology has outlived its
utility.1 New biotechnologies like CRISPR/Cas9, which allow scientists to make
precise modifications to plant and animal genomes simply and inexpensively, have
begun to transform the genetic engineering landscape.2 Their transformative potential
for agricultural, therapeutic, environmental, and even cosmetic applications is so
radical that even its own developers have called for a moratorium to develop ethical
frameworks and regulatory standards for its use.3 Yet the Coordinated Frameworkdeveloped while the first commercial cell phones were being offered for sale'continues to define federal biotechnology regulation.

* Professor of Law, WVU College of Law. The author would like to thank
Kelsey Haught and Esha
Sharma, WVU Law Class of 2017, for capable research assistance on this Article.

1 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,753 (Feb. 27, 1992)
[hereinafter Coordinated Framework].
2 See generally infra Section H.A.

3 See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
4 GEORGE THOMAS KURIAN & BARBARA A. CHERNOW, DATAPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES:
AMERICAN HISTORY IN NUMBERS 207 (4th ed. 2007).
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The Coordinated Framework need not be maintained out of loyalty or lethargy. It is
not law (it was issued by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy). 5
It was never opened for notice and comment (Presidential actions are not governed by
the Administrative Procedure Act).6 Many stakeholders-from small biotech labs 7 to
environmental groups' to consumers 9-have expressed dissatisfaction with FDA,
USDA, and EPA policy developed to implement it.
Of course, some things grow better with time. Unfortunately, the Coordinated
Framework is not one of them. The new generation of biotechnologies already does
and increasingly will create products that do not fall within the statutory triggers that
the Coordinated Framework directed FDA, USDA, and EPA to use to justify
regulation.10 As new technologies allow much smaller public and private labs to get
into the biotech innovation game, the tangled web of agency oversight over even just
one new plant or animal variety threatens more than ever to chill important
innovation. And evidence of the environmental and health impacts from farmers'
overuse of glyphosate -the herbicide to which most currently approved biotech seeds
are resistant-continues to grow. 12
The Obama Administration recognized the dilemma and, in July 2015, composed a
multi-agency task force to consider changes to the Coordinated Framework. 13 The task
force released its plan on September 16, 2016.14 The repackaged information and

5 See Coordinated Framework, supranote 1.

6 See Franklinv. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (holding that President is not an
"agency" and actions of President are not reviewable under APA).

7 See, e.g., Synthetic Biology ProjectComments on White House Plan to Update Coordinated
Framework,SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY PROJECT (July 2, 2015),
http://www.synbioproject.org/news/proj ect/white-house-asks-agencies-to-reconsider-biotech-framework/;
see also Yvonne Baskin, How GovernmentRegulatesA Life, THE ALICIA PATTERSON FOUNDATION (Apr.

11, 2011), http://aliciapatterson.org/stories/how-government-regulates-life ("[i]f an academic scientist who
wants to do an experiment has to do $100,000 worth of preliminary studies to get a permit, he's not going
to do it .... The data requirements are too great, and the granting system doesn't support that kind of
work.").

8 See Lydia Wheeler, GroupsPressFeds to Overhaul GMO Regulations,HILL (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://thehill.com/regulation/energy-environment/260269-groups-call-on-obama-administration-tooverhaul-gmo-regs; see also NFFC and Allies Oppose CoordinatedFrameworkProcess in Letter and

PressRelease, NATIONAL FAMILY FARM COALITION (Aug. 5, 2016), http://nffc.net/index.php/nffc-andallies-oppose-coordinated-framework-process-in-letter-and-press-release/.
9 See, e.g., Citizen Petition before the United States Food and Drug Administration Seeking
Mandatory Labeling for Genetically Engineered Foods, http://www.justlabelit.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/09/gelabelingpetition.pdf (petition by Center for Food Safety asking FDA to require
labeling of genetically-engineered foods pursuant to FDCA); cf Elaine Watson, FDA Denies GMO
LabelingPetition: What Matters is the Characteristicsof the Food Itself Not the Processby Which it was

Made, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA.COM (Nov. 23, 2015) (describing 30-page letter from FDA denying
petition), http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Manufacturers/FDA-denies-citizen-petition-demandingmandatory-GMO-labeling.
10 See infra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
I See infra Section II.B.
12 See infra Section II.C.
13 See JOHN P. HOLDREN ET AL., IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY AND ENSURING CONTINUED SAFETY

IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/
07/02/improving-transparency-and-ensuring-continued-safety-biotechnology.
14 Modernizing the Regulatory System for BiotechnologyProducts:An Update to the Coordinated

Frameworkor the RegulationofBiotechnology (Sep. 16, 2016) (detailing drafts of EPA, USDA, and FDA
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minor adjustments made to existing statutory authority barely put a Band-Aid on the
weaknesses of the statutes used as a basis for oversight over new biotech products.
This transformative moment in biotechnology offers an opportunity for
comprehensive reconsideration of federal biotechnology policy. Because of the gaps
in agency authority over the latest types of biotechnology products, new legislation is
likely necessary to reach the products of new technologies. In addition, new legislation
would afford an opportunity to address aspects of the Coordinated Framework that
continue to prove unsatisfactory to multiple stakeholder groups and to the agencies
themselves. This article outlines the rationale for a new statute and suggests a
framework that would make federal biotechnology regulation more comprehensible,
efficient, and effective.
Part I of this Article outlines the most relevant criticisms of the Coordinated
Framework from a variety of perspectives. First, the statutes identified by the
Coordinated Framework, as interpreted by the agencies, do not capture many
biotechnology products and will continue to overlook an ever-larger proportion of new
products. Second, small private and public laboratories (as well as some larger
companies) complain that the system is so difficult to navigate that many are
discouraged from pursuing biotechnology research, even though such research is
becoming increasingly affordable to conduct. Finally, civil society groups-primarily
environmental groups and consumer advocates-don't trust that the Coordinated
Framework and policies flowing from it really protect the public's interests. Although
some of the concerns expressed are overblown, others are well informed, and
continued dismissal of those concerns will only exacerbate public resistance to
potentially path-breaking new technologies.
Part II outlines a proposal for a new biosafety (not "biotechnology") statute that
would plug jurisdictional gaps, expand agency authority to provide useful
comprehensive monitoring and needed public research, and re-organize agency
functions to preserve existing expertise, while making the system more user-friendly
for developers of all sizes and more transparent for the public. This re-organization
would be more consistent with the principles for federal oversight of biotechnology
outlined in the Coordinated Framework. At the same time, it would accomplish two
complementary goals: reducing developer costs to encourage badly-needed
technological innovations in subsistence agricultural products, animal welfare, and
environmental benefits, and disease-control technologies that may not bring high
returns on investment; and taking seriously the most important civil society concerns
to increase the biotechnology industry's social license to operate.
I.

SCRAPPING THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK

New legislation for biotechnology oversight is needed for three reasons. First, the
new generation of technologies bears little resemblance to previous technologies that

of proposed refinements of framework for regulating existing technology) [hereinafter Update to
Coordinated Framework], https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/biotech
coordinated framework.pdf Emerging Technologies InteragencyPolicy CoordinationCommittee
Biotechnology Working Group, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, NationalStrategy
for Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology Products (September 2016) (plan for regulating

emerging genetic engineering technologies), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/micr
osites/ostp/biotech nationalstrategy.pdf.
15 See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
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could more easily be characterized as "plant pests" or "food additives" and will escape
regulation under statutes geared to those categories. Second, as new technologies make
genetic engineering cheaper and easier, small and public laboratories have a chance to
get into the game and develop life-saving technologies, but lack the resources to
navigate a complex, multi-agency system. Third, consumers have long been
unsatisfied with regulation under the Coordinated Framework, and continued
insistence on minimizing those concerns will lead to more consumer resistance. A new
approach to oversight at this time of transformational change in the technology could
address all of these problems.
A. New Technologies Will Escape It
Scientists have been attempting to manipulate the genetic code since the discovery
that DNA carried heritable information, but previous techniques have been compared
to "trying to perform surgery while wearing mittens." 16 New technologies, however,
have made genetic manipulation radically simpler and more precise. The most
promising of these techniques, called CRISPR/Cas9,1 7 was based on the discovery of
a similar natural system used by some bacteria to resist viruses."8 CRISPR/Cas9 is
simpler than previous genome editing technologies in several respects: It allows
scientists to make genetic changes by simply "programming" an enzyme with a short
set of instructions to the target organism's DNA. 19 It also allows researchers to modify
multiple sites of an organism's genome at the same time. 20 Finally, it accomplishes the
targeted genetic change at surprisingly high rates (although off-target effects do
occur). 2 1 One Nobel laureate referred to modem genome editing techniques as jaw16 Jeffrey M. Perkel, Editorial, The Power and Possibilitiesof Genome Engineering, SCIENCE 4, 4

(special report) (September 26, 2014).
17 See Nicholas J. Baltes & Daniel F. Voytas, Enabling PlantSynthetic Biology Through Genome
Engineering, 33 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 120, 123-24 (2015). Developers have used four different

classes of SSNs, called meganucleases, zinc finger nucleases (ZFNs), transcription activator-like effector
nucleases (TALENs), and clustered regularly-interspaced palindromic repeaters (CRISPR). Id at 122-24.
CRISPR/Cas9 uses site-directed or site-specific nucleases to delete, add, or change targeted DNA
sequences in an organism. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: EXPERIENCES
AND PROSPECTS 362 (2016), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23395/genetically-engineered-cropsexperiences-and-prospects. CRISPR accomplishes genetic mutations using two molecules - the Cas9
nuclease, which cuts both strands of DNA at a specific location to allow the mutation, and the guide RNA,
a sequence of about twenty base pairs that guides Cas9 to the target location of the genome modification.
The breaks in DNA are repaired by the cell, leading to deletions, insertions or rearrangements using the
template RNA sequence. See Khaoula Belhaj et al., Editing Plant Genomes with CRISPR/Cas9, 32
CURRENT OPINION BIOTECHNOLOGY 76 (2015).
18 See Martin Jinek et al., A ProgrammableDual-RNA-Guided DNA Endonucleasein Adaptive
BacterialImmunity, 337 SCI. 816, 816 (Aug. 17, 2012); Ruud Jansen et al., Identification ofGenes that
Are Associated with DNA Repeats in Prokaryotes,43 MOLECULAR MICROBIOLOGY 1565 (2002).

19 The CRISPR/Cas9 system only requires scientists to synthesize the short, twenty-nucleotide RNA
sequence. See Belhaj, supra note 17, at 76; Perkel, supra note 16, at 5.
20 See Le Cong et al., Multiplex Genome Engineering Using CRISPR/Cas Systems, 339 SCI. 819

(2013) (demonstrating editing of human and mouse cells at two loci); Prashant Mali et al., RNA-Guided
Human Genome Engineeringvia Cas9, 339 SCIENCE 823 (2013) (demonstrating editing of human cells at
two loci); Haoyi Wang et al., One-Step GenerationofMice CarryingMutations in Multiple Genes by
CRISPR/Cas-MediatedGenome Engineering, 153 CELL 910 (demonstrating modification of five genes in

mouse embryonic stem cells); see generally Perkel, supra note 16, at 5.
21 See, e.g., Thomas J. Cradick et al., CRISPR/Cas9 Systems Targeting fl-globin and CCR5 Genes
Have Substantial Off-Target Activity, 41 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 9584, 9584-85 (2013); Yanfang Fu et al.,
High-frequency Off-Target Mutagenesis Induced by CRISPR-CasNucleases in Human Cells, 31 NATURE
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dropping.22 In a special report entitled CRISPR/CAS-9: Engineering a Revolution in
Gene Editing, the magazine Science described the most promising of the new
techniques as a means for humans to modify not only our external environment, "but
to also engineer[] genetic adaptations for ourselves as well as other species." 23
Applications for genome editing using site-specific nucleases, especially
CRISPR/Cas9, are promising for both human and animal welfare. 24 In agriculture, for
example, researchers are working to introduce into dairy cattle a genetic variant that
causes some beef cattle to lack homs. 25 Farmers often de-horn dairy cattle, which are
kept in close quarters, for safety reasons, but physical de-horning methods are
invasive, painful, and expensive. 26 To introduce the trait through traditional crossbreeding would result in loss of favorable traits for dairy production, but genome
editing could introduce the variant into existing dairy herds without interfering with
other, desirable traits. 2 7 In medicine, genome editing is being used to explore the
possibility of knocking out the gene for CCR5, the functional co-receptor in T cells
used by the HIV-1 virus. 28 People who naturally lack the CCR5 gene may become
infected with the virus but do not become sick because their T-cells are resistant to
being killed. 29 Knocking out the CCR5 gene in bone marrow stem cells might provide
long-term HIV-resistant T cells to the recipient. 30 In public health, the CRISPR/Case9

BIOTECH. 822 (2013); but see Pratiksha I. Thakore et al., Highly Specific Epigenome Editing by
CRISPR/Cas9Repressorsfor Silencing ofDistalRegulatoryElements, 12 NATURE METHODS 1143 (2015)

(describing successful limitation of off-target effects by bundling rather than cutting genome in genetic
modifications using CRISPR). For a simple layman's description of CRISPR/Cas9, see What Is CRISPRCas9?, WELCOME GENOME CAMPUS (last updated Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.yourgenome.org/facts/

what-is-crispr-cas9. See also Baltes & Voytas, supra note 17, at 123-24; Belhaj, supra note 17, at 76-77;
Luisa Bortesi & Rainer Fischr, The CRISPR/Cas9 System for Plant Genome Editing and Beyond, 33
BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 41, 42 (2015); S. Antony Ceasar et al., Insert, Remove, Replace: A Highly
Advanced Genome Editing System Using CRISPR/Cas9, 1863 BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA 2333
(2016); NAT'L ACAD. OF ScI., supranote 17, at 365.
22 See Steve Connor, Exclusive: "Jaw-Dropping"BreakthroughHailed as Landmark in Fight
Against HereditaryDiseases as Crispr Technique Heralds Genetic Revolution, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 6,

2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/exclusive-jaw-dropping-breakthrough-hailed-aslandmark-in-fight-against-hereditary-diseases-as-8925295.html.
23 Tianna Hicklin, The Start of a New Genomic Era, in CRISPR - CAS9: ENGINEERING A
REVOLUTION IN GENE EDITING 2 (2016) (online special report), http://www.sciencemag.org/

sites/default/files/custom-publishing/documents/CRISPR-Cas9

booklet HighRes.pdf [hereinafter Science

Special Report]; see also Amy Maxmen, Easy DNA Editing Will Remake the World. Buckle Up., WIRED

(2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/07/crispr-dna-editing-2/.
24 See Dana Caroll & R. Alta Charo, The Societal Opportunitiesand Challengesof Genome Editing,
16 GENOME BIOLOGY 242 (2015).
25 See Wenfang Tan et al., Efficient Nonmeiotic Allele Introgressionin Livestock Using Custom
Endonucleases, 110 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. SCIS. 16,526, 16,526-27 (2013); Wenfang (Spring) Tan
et al., PrecisionEditing ofLarge Animal Genomes, 80 ADVANCES GENETICS 37, 70-72 (2012).
26 See Bruno Graf& Markus Senn, Behavioral and PhysiologicalResponses of Calves to
Dehorningby Heat Cauterisationwith or without LocalAnasthesia,62 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR SCI.

153 (1999).
27 See Dana Carroll & R. Alta Charo, supra note 24, at 243 (2015).
28 See Pablo Tebas et al., Gene Editing ofCCR5 in Autologous CD4 T Cells of PersonsInfected

with HIV, 370 NEw ENGLAND J. MED. 901 (2014).
29 See Carroll & Charo, supranote 24, at 245.
30 Id.
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technology may be combined with a natural system called a gene drive, 31 Which would
allow scientists to manipulate the DNA of mosquitos carrying diseases like malaria
and Zika so that they give birth to sterile offspring, wiping out the disease-carrying
population within a few mosquito generations. 32
While these developments are momentous, the full ramifications of genome editing
are not yet well understood. Applications of CRISPR/Cas9 to the human germline
(including eggs and sperm), would be inherited by the patient's children and thus cause
permanent alterations to the human gene pool. 3 3 If used not just to cure serious diseases
but also to enhance desirable physical or mental traits, CRISPR/Cas9 gives rise to
worries that the technology may be used to create "designer humans." 34 Even the
prospect of curing many common diseases and vastly increasing human life
expectancies raises complicated social, economic and ecological questions. 35 With
regard to gene drives, sterilization of whole populations within a few generations could
cause unknown consequences such as proliferation of other pests. 36
Effective oversight to address the specific risks of these potential new products is
urgently needed. Influential scientists, including a Nobel Prize winner and the
scientists who published the discovery of the CRISPR/Cas9 system, have called for a
temporary moratorium on application of the technology to discuss ethical and legal
controls. 3 7 At a meeting of scientists convened by the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) in December 2015, the group concluded that it would be "irresponsible to
proceed" with making inheritable changes to the human genome until there was "broad
societal consensus about the appropriateness" of the practice. 38 The NAS has called
for increased funding for laboratory experiments and highly controlled field trials for
gene drives, but has opposed uncontrolled environmental releases based on the current
state of knowledge. 3 9
The Coordinated Framework wasn't designed to and does not meet the need for
oversight of products resulting from these path-breaking technologies. In the

31 NAS has defined gene drives as "systems of biased inheritance in which the ability of a genetic
element to pass from a parent to its offspring through sexual reproduction is enhanced." NAT'L ACAD. OF
SCI., GENE DRIVES ON THE HORIZON: ADVANCING SCIENCE, NAVIGATING UNCERTAINTY, AND ALIGNING

RESEARCH WITH PUBLIC VALUES 15 (2016).
32 See Robert L. Unckless et al, Modeling the Manipulation ofNatural Populationsby the
Mutagenic Chain Reaction, 201 GENETICS 425 (2015).
33 See Nicholas Wade, Scientists Callfor Moratoriumon EditingHuman Genome, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 4, 2015 at Al, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/science/crispr-cas9-human-genome-editingmoratorium.html.
34 See Michael Spector, DNA Revolution, NAT'L GEO., August 2016,

http://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/08/dna-crispr-gene-editing-science-ethics.html;
Wade, supra note 33.
35 See e.g., Charles McConnel & Leigh Turner, Medicine, Ageing, and Human Longevity, 6 EMBO

REP. S59 (2005).
36 See Unckless, supranote 32, at 425-26, 428 ("the speed of the process presents reason for
considerable caution before considering a field release of such a construct").
37 See David Baltimore et al., A PrudentPath Forwardfor Genomic Engineeringand Germline
Gene Modification, 348 SCI. 36 (2015); Wade, supranote 33.

38 Wade, supra note 33. Not all scientists agree that the risks justify a moratorium, however. See
George Church, Perspective:Encourage the Innovators, 528 NATURE S7 (2015),

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26630599.
39 NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 17, at 505-10.
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Coordinated Framework, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) divided regulatory authority for agricultural biotechnology among three
federal agencies: USDA, which regulates the testing and commercialization of new
agricultural biotech products; FDA, which regulates the introduction and marketing of
foods created through the use of genetic engineering; and EPA, which regulates
genetically-altered microorganisms and pesticide properties of genetically-engineered
plant varieties.40 Each of these agencies regulates under statutes that pre-date
commercial agricultural biotechnology. FDA's authority is based primarily on the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 1 a 1938 act that includes authorization for
FDA to ensure food safety through regulation of food additives and misbranding.4 2
USDA's authority stems primarily from a law that dates back to the Federal Plant Pest
Act of 1957,43 reorganized in the PPA, which gave USDA jurisdiction over bacteria
and viruses. 4 EPA derives its authority from the relatively modem pesticide and toxics
control laws of the 1970s, including the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act 5 (FIFRA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act46 (TSCA).1 7 Based
on the direction of the OSTP in the 1986 Coordinated Framework, FDA, EPA, and
USDA proceeded to articulate policy statements and regulations in the late 1980s and
into the 1990s." These policies and regulations, with some more recent amendments,4 9
still control biotechnology oversight today.

40 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26,
1986) [hereinafter 1986 Coordinated Framework]; see also Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (Dec. 31, 1984).
41 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-399f (2012)).
42 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s) (defining "food additive"), 321(n) (defining "misbranding"), 331
(prohibiting introduction of adulterated or misbranded foods); 371-72 (providing for regulatory and
enforcement authority by FDA).
43 Federal Plant Pest Act of 1957,7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj (2012), reorganizedby Plant Protection
Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7786 (2012).

44 See generally 7 U.S.C. §§

7701-7786 (2012).

45 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2012). Congress
originally enacted FIFRA in 1947; the Act was amended in 1972. FederalInsecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oecaagct/1fra.html

[https://perma.cc/HD6H-RDQM] (last updated June 27, 2012).
46 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2697 (2012).

47 See Statement of Policy; Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313 (June 26, 1986) (providing
the EPA policy statement for exercising authority under FIFRA and TSCA).
48 See, e.g., Introduction of Organisms and Products Altered or Produced Through Genetic
Engineering Which Are Plant Pests or Which There Is Reason to Believe Are Plant Pests, 52 Fed. Reg.
22,892, (June 16, 1987) [hereinafter Introduction of Plant Pests]; Genetically Engineered Organisms and
Products; Notification Procedures for the Introduction of Certain Regulated Articles; and Petition for
Nonregulated Status, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,036 (Nov. 6, 1992) [hereinafter USDA - Genetically Engineered
Organisms and Products]; Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg.
22,984 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter FDA Statement of Policy]; Proposed Policy; Plant-Pesticides Subject
to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
59 Fed. Reg. 60,496 (Nov. 23, 1994) [hereinafter EPA - Proposed Policy].
49 See, e.g., Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. 4,706 (Jan 18, 2001);
Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Simplification of Requirements and Procedures for
Genetically Engineered Organisms, 62 Fed. Reg. 23,945 (May 2, 1997).
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These policies were outdated almost as soon as they were established. Under the
PPA, for example, APHIS exercises jurisdiction over "plant pests," defined as
anything that could injure, damage, or cause disease in plants, including bacteria and
viruses. 0 Consistent with the policy recommendations of the executive branch,"
APHIS interpreted its jurisdiction over plant pests to extend to the bacteria and viruses
used to transfer new genetic traits into plants.5 2 Since the bacteria or virus remained in
the genetically modified organisms (GMOs), the PPA gave APHIS regulatory
oversight over most GMO plants at that time and for many years afterward.5 3
By basing GMO regulation on the PPA's grant of authority to USDA to regulate
plant pests, however, the executive branch left a gap in the regulatory framework for
the new classes of biotechnology that do not rely on bacterial or viral vectors. This
misfit began as soon as developers began using material other than bacteria and viruses
-such as a "gene gun"-to deliver DNA to a target organism." And the misfit
between statute and technology has only grown: new genome-editing technologies like
meganucleases, ZFNs, TALENs, and CRISPR/Cas9 don't deliver transgenic material
to the target organism by any means, plant pest or otherwise, but instead make direct
modifications or deletions of traits within the organism's genome without inserting
new material at all.5" Without the plant pest trigger, APHIS has already issued
numerous letters to biotech product developers confirming that it has no jurisdiction
over many new products.56 And no other agency has authority to fulfill the functions
previously performed by APHIS: monitoring field tests, reviewing safety data,
assessing the impact of environmental releases of the new organism, and issuing
deregulation decisions when all safety standards are confirmed. 7
In 1992, FDA announced its policy regarding new plant varieties derived from
biotechnology." The FDCA allows FDA to regulate "food additives."5 9 Since the first
genetically-engineered foods involved the insertion of new DNA into a plant's genome
using bacterial vectors, that generation of GMO foods arguably fell within the
statutory definition of a food additive: "any substance the intended use of which results

50 7 U.S.C. § 7702(14) (2012). The Plant Protection Act defines a "plant pest" as "any living stage
of any of the following that can directly or indirectly injure, cause damage to, or cause disease in any plant
or plant product: (A) A protozoan. (B) A nonhuman animal. (C) A parasitic plant. (D) A bacterium. (E) A
fungus. (F) A virus or viroid. (G) An infectious agent or other pathogen. (H) Any article similar to or
allied with any of the articles specified in the preceding subparagraphs." Id.
51 See 1986 Coordinated Framework, supra note 40.
52 See Introduction of Plant Pests, supra note 48, at 22,908 (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 340).
53 Id.

54 See, e.g., Carole Gan, Gene Gun AcceleratesDNA-Coated Particles to Transform Intact Cells,

THE SCIENTIST Sept. 18, 1989, http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/10616/title/genegun-accelerates-dna-coated-particles-to-transform-intact-cells/.
55 See supra, notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
56 See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supranote 17, at 330 (Table 9-3) (identifying products over which

APHIS issued an opinion that it lacked jurisdiction under the PPA).
57 See Biotechnology Regulatory Service (BRS), ANIAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S.

DEP'T AGRIC,, (overview of USDA oversight of biotechnology),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology [https://perma.cc/2ZHH-K8AQ].
58 FDA, Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 (May
29, 1992).
59 21 U.S.C. § 348.
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or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a
component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food." 60 But new genetic
engineering techniques do not necessarily involve transferring any material into the
plant products at all: genome editing techniques like CRISPR, for example, directly
edit the genome of the target organism without inserting any new material.61 Since
many of the new technologies do not insert any foreign material into the target
organism, it is far from obvious whether new technologies such as genome editing will
be considered to contain "food additives," and whether FDA will have jurisdiction to
regulate them.6 2 Although FDA decided in a 1992 to treat all transgenic material as
"generally recognized as safe" (GRAS) and therefore presumptively exempt from the
premarket safety review process, FDA at least possesses statutory jurisdiction over
such organisms and could, if it wished, reverse its GRAS presumption.6 3 For nontransgenic organisms, however, such jurisdiction may be entirely absent.

60 21 U.S.C. § 321(s).
61 See Alison Peck, The FailureofFederal BiotechnologyRegulation, 51 VALPARAISO UNIV. L.

REV. (forthcoming 2017).
62 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012). Under longstanding federal biotechnology policy, a genetic
engineeringprocess is differentiated from the genetic engineeringproduct. See Exercise of Federal
Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority: Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the
Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,753, 6,756 (Feb. 27, 1992) ("No conceptual distinction exists between
genetic modification of plants and microorganismby classical methods orby molecular techniques that
modify DNA and transfer genes.") (quoting National Research Council, Field Testing Genetically
Modified Organisms: Framework for Decisions 14 (1989)). As long as FDA adheres to this policy choice,
it will be difficult to stretch the definition of "food additive" to accommodate foods produced through
genetic engineering processes that do not involve the addition of any "substance" even in the production
phase.
63 FDCA considers a substance to be a "food additive" only "if such substance is not generally
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having
been adequately shown through scientific procedures . .. to be safe under the conditions of its intended
use . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 321(s). In a 1992 policy statement, FDA announced a presumption that all
genetically-engineered foods are safe and thus exempt from food additive review process. See FDA
Statement of Policy, supra note 48. Under full pre-market safety review for food additives, food producers
are required to submit a petition to FDA demonstrating safety of the food, accompanied by supporting
data generated by scientifically accepted methods. 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(2). FDA may also require the
petitioner to submit samples of the additive for testing, and provide descriptions of production methods
and facilities. Id. §§ 348(b)(3)-(4). FDA is required to make an independent determination within ninety
days as to the safety of the food before the food canbe marketed. Id. §§ 348(c)(1)-(3). The regulationto
approve the additive proposed by the petitioner must be published within thirty days of filing Id.
§ 348(b)(5). Although the FDCA does not mandate pre-order notice and comment, FDA as a practical
matter receives or invites public comment on the proposed regulation. See Lars Noah & Richard A.
Merrill, Startingfrom Scratch?: Reinventing the FoodAdditive Approval Process, 78 BOSTON UNIV. L.

REV. 329, 371 (1998). Orders issued by FDA may be stayed pending a challenge by any person adversely
affected, 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(e)-(f), and are subject to judicial review. Id. § 348(g). According to FDA, all
foods derived from genetic engineering fall into this "generally recognized as safe" (or "GRAS")
exemption from the pre-market safety review process. FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 48. FDA
reasoned, that "transferred genetic material [nucleic acids] ... are present in the cells of every living
organism ... and do not raise a safety concern as a component of food. In regulatory terms, such material
is presumed to be GRAS." Id. As a result of this presumption, all foods produced using genetic
engineering are exempt from the pre-market safety review process for food additives unless FDA the
intended expression of the genetic material differs significantly from substances already found in food. Id.
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B. Developers Can'tFollow It
Innovation in food, drugs, and agriculture is increasingly coming from small biotech
companies.6 As CRISPR/Cas9 makes genome editing easy and inexpensive, small
and public laboratories are even more likely to be the source of revolutionary
products.65 The maze of regulation for even a single new biotechnology product,
however, can become an insurmountable hurdle for companies and institutions that
lack the resources to navigate the system. 66 In most cases, small companies will require
the financial backing of venture capitalists or acquisition of the technology by a larger
company to take the product to commercialization. 67 Those investors or buyers,
however, will require the small company to be able to demonstrate "proof of concept,"
including assurances that the product is likely to gain regulatory approval. 68 Such
assurances require the developer to be able to answer questions such as what the
approval process will be, how long it will take, and how much up-front cost will be
entailed before the product can be commercialized. 69 Yet little guidance on these
questions exists under the convoluted maze of the Coordinated Framework. 70
This regulatory maze will stifle important innovation. As one biotech industry
lawyer commented, the regulatory hurdles "are experienced disproportionally by
business entities least able to address them but most essential to innovation itself,
namely the quintessential small-business start-up that develops a breathtakingly
innovative product and finds itself shell-shocked in trying to navigate a regulatory
pathway in a sometimes incoherent and invariably opaque governance construct."7 1
Reducing these regulatory obstacles for small developers was one of the stated goals
of the Obama Administration's attempt to update the Coordinated Framework. 72 In a
July 2, 2015, statement announcing the task force to update the Coordinated
Framework, the White House Office of Science and Technology acknowledged that
the multiplicity of regulatory channels "can make it difficult for the public to
understand how the safety of biotechnology products is evaluated, and navigating the

64 See Bruno Speder, Making Small Biotech Work, THE MEDICINE 1MAKER (April
2016),

https://themedicinemaker.com/issues/0416/making-small-biotech-work/; Lynn L. Bergeson, Industrial
Biotechnology: CoordinatedFrameworkMake-Over and Lots More, 11 INDUS. BIOTECHNOLOGY 237,
243 (2015).
65 See Vivek Wadhwa, Gene Editing Is Now Cheap and Easy - and No One Is Preparedfor the
Consequences, SINGULARITY HUB (Sept. 8, 2015), http://singularityhub.com/2015/09/08/gene-editing-is-

now-cheap-and-easy-and-no-one-is-prepared-for-the-consequences/ ("Because CRISPR is cheap and easy
to use, it has both revolutionized and democratized genetic research").
66 See, e.g., Baskin, supra note 7; Jack W. Scannell et al, Diagnosingthe Decline in Pharmaceutical

R&D Efficiency, 11 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 192 (Fig. la) (2012) (reporting that costs
of regulatory approval process for a single drug exceed $1 billion).
67 See Speder, supranote 64.
68 Id.

69 See Bergeson, supra note 64, at 244.
70 Id.

71 Id. at 243.
72 JOHN P. HOLDREN, ET. AL., OFFICE OF SCI. & TECHN. POL'Y, MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF

FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, & U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. (July 2, 2015), https://www.

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/modernizing the reg system for biotech_products
memo final.pdf [https://perma.cc/FPG8-ZH9T].
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regulatory process for these products can be unduly challenging, especially for small
companies."73

The resulting update, released in September 2016, seems to have been met with
disappointment.74 The update failed even to consider or give regulatory guidance on
the treatment of products from technologies on the horizon such as genome editing
through CRISPR and gene drives in insect populations.75 Instead, the report primarily
repackages existing information about respective agency jurisdiction over existing
products. 76 As one commenter noted, "the portion of the OSTP process that was in the
public eye shifted from 'development of an updated [Coordinated Framework]' in the
White House memo to clarification of authorities for current products that clearly fall
into existing authorities."7 7 While the repackaging of information about the existing
regulatory maze may help some small developers who are entirely unfamiliar with the
system, it does nothing to address the growing gaps in agency jurisdiction or to
simplify the approval framework for smaller players. An accompanying document, the
NationalStrategyfor Modernizing the Regulatory System for BiotechnologyProducts,
expressly identifies its purpose as meeting the President's charge to "develop a longterm strategy to ensure that the Federal regulatory system is equipped to efficiently
assess the risks, if any, of the future products of biotechnology." 78 Unfortunately, this
nineteen-page document (including seven pages of prefatory and background
information) offers little more than a commitment to continued study and reporting. 79
C. Consumers Don't Trust It
Consumer resistance to genetic engineering is well documented. 0 In recent years,
that resistance has been focused on a movement to require labeling of "GMOs," which
has resulted in several state labeling laws," federal litigation challenging such laws on

73 JOHN P. HOLDREN ET AL., THE WHITE HOUSE, IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY AND ENSURING

CONTINUED SAFETY IN BIOTECHNOLOGY (July 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/

07/02/improving-transparency-and-ensuring-continued-safety-biotechnology [https://perma.cc/GEB8DBBG].
74 See, e.g., Jennifer Kuzma, A Missed Opportunityfor U.S. Biotechnology Regulation, 353 SCI.

1211 (2016).
75 See Update to the Coordinated Framework, supra note 14.
76 Id.

77

Kuzma, supra note 74, at 1212.

78 EMERGING TECHS. INTERAGENCY POL'Y COORDINATION COMM.'S BIOTECHNOLOGY WORKING
GRP., OFFICE OF SCI. AND TECHN. POL'Y, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR MODERNIZING THE REGULATORY

SYSTEM FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS 4-5 (September 2016),

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/biotech national strategy final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3PZ-ML67] [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY].
79 See id. at 2-8.
80 See, e.g., John G. Knight, et al., Consumer Benefits andAcceptanceofGenetically Modified

Food, 5 J. PUB. AFFAIRS 226 (2005); Wallace E. Huffman, et al., Consumers' Resistance to Genetically
Modified Foods in High Income Countries: The Role of Information in an Uncertain Environment,
Proceedings of the 2 5 th Int'l Conference of Agricultural Economists (2003), https://core.ac.uk/download/
pdf/655333 1.pdf; Jason McLure, GeneticallyModified Food: Should Labels Be Required?, 22 CQ
RESEARCHER 717 (Aug. 31, 2012), http://library.cqpress.com/
cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre2012083100.
81 See VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9, § 3043 (West 2016) (enacted May 8, 2014); 2014 ME. LAWS 565
(enacted Jan. 12, 2014); 2013 CONN. ACTS 13-183 (Reg. Sess.) (enacted June 25, 2013).
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First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause grounds,8 2 and a new federal law to
require a limited form of labeling and preempt state labeling laws.8 3 Consumer outcry
against genetic engineering may be partly mollified by the new federal legislation,
although the details remain to be determined by USDA regulations. 4 In light of
widespread criticism of the federal law, the small number of states with labeling laws,
and concerns unrelated to labeling, however, consumer resistance to genetic
engineering may persist even after resolution of the labeling issue. And consumer
resistance will likely be redoubled at the prospect of transformative technologies with
potentially far-reaching impacts for human germline modification and permanent
environmental changes.
The September 2016 update to the Coordinated Framework continues to minimize
consumer concerns, brushing off consumer resistance as a mere "transparency"
problem and insisting on the adequacy of the framework. In a press release, the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy stated that "[t]he proposed update
offers the public a complete picture of a robust and flexible regulatory structure that
provides appropriate oversight for all products of modem biotechnology." 5 The report
expressed the view that the current system "effectively protects health and the
environment," but that uncertainty about jurisdiction and unpredictability about
timeframes and processes have burdened developers and "limited the ability of the
public to understand easily how the safety of these products is assured."8 6 In addition,
the National Strategy does not explain how, if at all, it will be legally authorized to
exercise jurisdiction over new products that may in fact present significant risks but
do not fall within the statutory categories devoted to agency jurisdiction.
Greater "transparency" will do nothing to allay the most rational consumer concerns
about the existing and growing holes in federal oversight of biotechnology. Even after
misinformation is sifted out, such rational concerns do exist. First, most biotechnology
products on the market to date offer little benefit to consumers. Approved traits
predominantly offer herbicide resistance or plant-incorporated pesticides that appeal

82 Grocery Mfrs. Ass'nv. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015), appealfiled, May 6, 2015.
83 National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, Pub. L. No. 114-216, 130 Stat. 834 (2016)
(amending Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 to add Subtitle E, National Bioengineered Food Disclosure
Standard) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C § 1639 et seq.); see also Stephen Dinan, Obama Signs Bill
Overturning Vermont's GMO Labeling Law, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2016),

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/aug/2/obama-signs-bill-overtuming-vermonts-gmo-labeling/
[https://perma.cc/G5NZ-VWF]; Dan Charles, Congress Just Passeda GMO LabelingBill. Nobody's
Super HappyAbout It, NAT'L PUBLIC RADIO (July 14, 2016), http://www.

npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/07/14/486060866/congress-just-passed-a-gmo-labeling-bill-nobodys-superhappy-about-it [https://perma.cc/M4KP-3MW6].
" See National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, supra note 83, § 293(a) (directing USDA
to establish national mandatory disclosure standard for bioengineered foods and procedures and
regulations for carrying out national standard).
85 ROBBIE BARBERO ET AL., THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING ON 30 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE TO

PREPARE FOR THE FUTURE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/09/16/building-30-years-experience-prepare-futuire-biotechnology

[https://perma.cc/3W4T-V8WU].
86 Update to the Coordinated Framework, supra note 14, at 4.
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to farmers, not taste or health benefits that would appeal to consumers. 7 Isolation of
the effect of genetically-engineered foods on consumer food prices is difficult, and
studies of the issue have reached conflicting conclusions." All in all, the benefits of
genetically-engineered foods may not outweigh the scientifically-valid health and
environmental costs discussed below. Even if all scientifically unwarranted concerns
were allayed, many consumers probably would not choose to purchase products that
offer few or no discernable taste or health benefits but do entail some (more limited)
risks.89
Second, consumers can reasonably be concerned about FDA's policy decisions to
presume all new biotech products to be GRAS and to rely on developer data in the
voluntary pre-market safety review. In its 2016 report, the NAS carefully worded its
finding as to the safety of genetically-engineered foods to avoid overstatement of
certainty90 and has acknowledged gaps and uncertainties in existing research about
health and safety.91 The World Health Organization has noted that it is not possible to
make a statement across the board that genetically engineered foods are safe, because
each product is distinct and may pose distinct risks.92 Given these particularities and
uncertainties, consumers may reasonably prefer product- and risk-specific FDA
oversight of new genetically-engineered foods.
The Coordinated Framework does not afford such oversight. FDA's jurisdiction
over GMO foods derives from the FDCA, which allows FDA to regulate "food
additives."9 3 In a 1992 policy statement, however, FDA announced a presumption that
all GE foods are safe and thus exempt from its customary premarket safety review
process for food additives.94 Instead, FDA encourages a voluntary, non-public
consultation process, which as a matter of practice all developers have utilized before
bringing a new GMO food to market. 95 But the voluntary premarket review process,

87 See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supranote 17, at 48, Table 3-1 (describing products and traits
deregulated and in production as of 2015, only nonbrowning potato, nonbrowning apple, high oleic acid
soybeans appeal directly to consumers).
88 See lan Murnaghan, What are the Cost Benefits ofGM Foods?, (May 17, 2016)

http://www.geneticallymodifiedfoods.co.uk/what-are-cost-benefits-gm-foods.html.
89 Cj John G. Knight et al., Acceptance of GM Food- an Experiment in Six Countries, 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 507, 508 (2007).

90 See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 17, at xv ("We received impassioned requests to give the
public a simple, general, authoritative answer about G.E. crops. Given the complexity of GE issues, we
did not see that as appropriate.").
91 See generally id. at 113-51 (discussing scope of scientific knowledge, noting limitations, and
encouraging federal funding for follow-up on areas of concern).
92 World Health Organization, Food Safety: FrequentlyAsked Questionson GeneticallyModified

Foods, http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas work/food-technology/faq-genetically-modified-food/en/
("Different GM organisms include different genes inserted in different ways. This means that individual
GM foods and their safety should be assessed on a case-by-case basis and that it is not possible to make
general statements on the safety of all GM foods.").
93 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012).
94 See FDA Statement of Policy, supra note 48.
-

95 See id.; see also CONSULTATION PROCEDURES UNDER FDA's 1992 STATEMENT OF POLICY
FOODS DERIVED FROM NEW PLANT VARIETIES (June 1996, rev. Oct. 1997),

http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatorylnformation/ucm
96126.htm [hereinafter FDA Consultation Procedures]. In 2001, FDA proposed making the premarket
consultation requirement mandatory, see FDA, Premarket Notice Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66
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unlike the mandatory food additive review, relies on developer data to establish
product safety and does not allow the public to review or participate in FDA's review
of the developer's safety data.96 This lack of transparency has led to considerable
consumer distrust of FDA's determinations.97
Third, some consumer concerns focus on environmental rather than health impacts,
and some of those impacts are well established scientifically. The most significant
problem to date has been the rise of glyphosate-resistant "superweeds" that have
caused dramatic crop losses since 2010.98 Although transgenic crops have offered
numerous environmental benefits, the NAS in 2010 recognized that the trend toward
increased glyphosate use, if sufficiently widespread, "would negate the environmental
benefits previously achieved."99 Because so many approved transgenic products have
offered plants with resistance to the common herbicide glyphosate,100 farmers have
shifted away from use of other herbicides and non-chemical weed control methods and
relied largely on glyphosate spraying to manage weeds, leading to the rise of
glyphosate-resistant strains.101 In 2016, NAS concluded that "[w]eed resistance to
glyphosate is a problem" and that "integrated weed-management approaches beyond
simply spraying mixtures of herbicides are needed" but not currently available. 10 2
Other potential environmental impacts, while not yet well established, have also raised
concerns. 103 These include a shift back to other pesticides as weeds develop glyphosate
resistance;o' transfer of genetically-engineered traits to non-genetically-engineered

Fed. Reg. 4706 (2001), but the rule was never made final. See Proposed Rule, Premarket Notice
Concerning Bioengineered Foods, 66 Fed. Reg. at 4707-08.
96 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 348 (mandatory pre-market safety review for food additives) with FDA
1992 Statement of Policy, supra note 63.
97 See, e.g., Zack Kaldveer, Organic Consumers Association, Five Ways the FDA has Failed
Consumers on GeneticallyEngineeredFoods, https://www.organicconsumers.org/news/five-ways-fda-

has-failed-consumers-genetically-engineered-foods. In a 2006 survey by the Pew Institute on
Biotechnology, only 14 percent of respondents trusted "government regulators" for information about
biotechnology, ranking eighth out of eleven options. When asked specifically about FDA, 29 percent said
they trusted the agency for such information, the fourth most selected option (after "friends and family,"
"farmers," and "scientists and academics"). Memorandum from The Mellman Group, Inc. to The Pew
Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/
wwwpewtrustsorg/PublicOpinion/FoodandBiotechnology/2006summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWD6LVBV].
98 See William Neuman & Andrew Pollack, Rise of the Superweeds, N.Y. TIIES, May 4, 2010 at
B1; NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 17, at 72-75. The problem has been more extreme in the South, but
by 2010 had spread as far north as Missouri, home of the St. Louis-area-based Monsanto. See Georgina
Gustin, Roundup 's Potency Slips, Foils Farmers;Resistant Weeds Are SpreadingNorth, Adding Costs,

Workload, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 25, 2010, at Al. One herbicide-tolerant crop, pigweed, can
grow up to three inches a day and reach heights of seven feet, and is so hardy that it can damage
harvesting equipment. Neuman & Pollack, supra, at Bl.
99 NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 17, at 77.
100

See ANImAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, BIOTECHNOLOGY,

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/petitions table_pending.shtml (listing seven determinations of
nonregulated status for products with glyphosate-resistant traits).
10 1

See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 17, at 81-90.

102 Id. at 139.
103 Id. at 104-10.
104 See id. at 85-87; Chris Boerboom & Michael Owen, FactsAbout Glyphosate-ResistantWeeds
(2006), https://www.extensionpurdue.edu/extmedia/gwc/gwc-1.pdf.
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varieties of cultivated crops in neighboring fields, which can reduce food crop
biodiversity;os transfer of genetically-engineered traits to weedy relatives, which may
produce weed-management problems;106 and transfer of genetically-engineered traits
to wild strains, which can then outcompete wild strains and reduce genetic diversity
available for crop improvement. 10 7
Consumer resistance is a problem for the biotech industry because it impedes the
industry's social license to operate.108 To overcome this resistance, federal
biotechnology oversight must become more responsive to consumers' realistic
concerns, not just sweep that resistance under the rug as a "transparency" problem.
Representatives of the biotech industry acknowledge this problem. As one industry
lawyer stated, "Public discourse is essential to the success of these technologies. If the
public is unconvinced that the government is able to review and assure the safety of
these technologies, the chance of commercial success is greatly diminished." 109
Federal regulators are much more likely to succeed in fostering that commercial
success if they begin to acknowledge and address consumers' legitimate concerns and
press Congress for new legislation to empower them to regulate biotechnology more
effectively.
II.

RE-FRAMING BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION:
PROPOSAL

The jurisdictional gaps and growing incongruence between the Coordinated
Framework and the products of biotechnology demand new legislation. Fortunately,
the need to correct our course about biotechnology offers an opportunity to improve
oversight based on a generation of experience. A successful re-framing of federal
biotechnology oversight through new legislation could accomplish multiple goals:
build on existing agency experience and expertise; better align regulatory oversight

105 NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 17, at 91-94. In general, the report was unable to confirm a
reduction in on-farm insect, weed or crop biodiversity that could be proven to be related to geneticallyengineered crops.
106 In the United States, scientists have documented at least fifteen crop species that hybridize with
weedy relatives. Id at 107-10.

107 Only a few crops (sunflower, pecan, blueberry, and some squashes) were domesticated in the
United States, so the risk to conservation of genetic diversity is less acute here than in countries with more
native species and landraces, id. at 107, but consumer concerns about global biodiversity are valid.
Moreover, because of international trade and movement of genetically-modified seed the risk of
contamination elsewhere may depress trade markets for U.S. agricultural products - even potentially
affecting non-genetically-engineered varieties. See Memorandum Order at 3-4, In re: Syngenta AG MIR
162 Corn Litigation, MDL No. 2591, Case No. 14-md-2591-JWL, (D. Kan. Sep. 11, 2015) (granting in
part and denying in part Syngenta's motion to dismiss lawsuit by plaintiff corn and milo growers alleging
harm to market for non-genetically-engineered products in China due to Chinese buyers' concerns about
contamination by GE traits not yet approved there); see also Ricardo Lopez, ChinaRejects Shipments of
GeneticallyModified Corn, L.A. TIES, Dec. 27, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-chinarejects-shipment-of-gmo-com-20131227-story.html; Chuin-Wei Yap, China Rejects U.S. Corn Imports
After Finding GMO Strain in Cargoes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/

SB10001424052702304866904579269301661883792.
108 See generally Geert Demuijnck & Bjrm Fasterling, The Social License to Operate, 136 J. BUS.
ETHICS 675 (2016); Kathleen M. Wilburn & Ralph Wilburn, Achieving SocialLicense to Operate Using
Stakeholder Theory, 4 J. INT'L BUS. ETHICS 3 (2011).
109 Bergeson, supra note 69, at 244.
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with risk; simplify the approval process for developers; address legitimate health,
safety, and environmental concerns; adapt seamlessly to changes in technology; and
provide federal funding for monitoring and research on the greatest areas of scientific
uncertainty or known deleterious impacts. Re-framing that would accomplish all of
these goals is within reach, but requires new legislation and abandonment of the
approach taken by the Coordinated Framework under pre-existing statutes that did not
contemplate modem technology and risks.
A. RegulatingAll New Varieties ofPlants, Animals, Microbes,
andInsects
New biotech legislation should designate a single agency to lead all regulatory
approvals for any new plant, animal, microbe, or insect variety. USDA should have
lead jurisdiction over any new plant varieties, FDA over new animal varieties, and
EPA over new microbe or insect varieties. This shift to a single lead agency would
serve at least three important functions: preserving agency expertise, simplifying the
system for developers and the public, and more closely linking regulation with risk.
First, designation of a single lead agency would preserve expertise developed by
the agencies since the 1980s. Because of the reliance on pre-existing statutes, the
Coordinated Framework often requires oversight by more than one agency over a
single product. For example, for a new transgenic corn variety intended for use in food,
USDA would regulate field trials under the PPA, and FDA would consult with the
developer under the voluntary premarket safety review procedure for new foods under
the FDCA. Any Bt corn product would be reviewed by USDA under the PPA and by
EPA under FIFRA.
This set-up creates a lengthy maze that developers seeking approval and citizens
seeking information must navigate for a single product. The speed of the U.S.
regulatory system compares unfavorably with other countries: For example, between
January 2010 and June 2013, the time from developer request (after field trials) to
agency approval for single-trait products was 1,210 days in the United States,
compared with 771 days in Canada and 372 days in Brazil.110
Instead, the benefit of most agency experience could be preserved by directing each
new product to a single agency. With regard to plants, the majority of work so far has
been conducted by USDA (specifically APHIS) under the PPA, since tmnsgenic plants
that used bacterial vectors have been subject to plant pest oversight under the PPA. 111
Only plants with food additives that are intended for use as food (as opposed to animal
feed, fiber, or ethanol) are subject to FDA premarket safety review, and that review is
more cursory than PPA oversight since FDA only reviews the developer's own safety
data rather than conducting its own studies. 1 12 Similarly, only transgenic plants
engineered to contain pesticides go through EPA's plant-incorporated protectant (PIP)
review.113

110 See Sarah Gonzalez, Biotech Backlog: Can USDA Catch Up?, AGRI-PULSE (June 4, 2014)
(citing analysis presented to USDA by industry groups in May 2014), http://www.agri-pulse.com/Biotechbacklog-Can-USDA-catch-up-06042014.asp.

111 See 7 U.S.C. § 7702 (2012).
112 See 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(2).
113 See EPA, Regulations under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for PlantIncorporated Protectants, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,772 (July 19, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 152 and 174).
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Regarding new animal varieties, so far only genetically-engineered salmon has been
approved for commercial sale."' The salmon was subject to review by FDA under its
FDCA authority over new animal drugs. 1 Thus, new animal varieties could be
efficiently assigned to FDA as lead agency.
Genetically-engineered microbes have been reviewed by EPA as "new chemical
substances" under TSCA,116 while genetically-engineered insects have not yet been
submitted for approval. Those that are now in development are intended primarily to
prevent disease in humans by altering the population or genetic make-up of diseasecarrying mosquitos in the environment, and some of the most urgent concerns
regarding genetically-engineered insects and gene drives involve the secondary and
unforeseen ecological impacts of fundamentally altering one species in an
ecosystem. 117 EPA is best situated to forecast, monitor and evaluate environmental
impacts and should be assigned lead agency duties over genetically-engineered
microbes and insects.
B. Inter-Agency Consultationsand Opinions
Allocation of lead agency authority to one agency does not mean that the lead
agency must learn to review impacts beyond its expertise. Instead, the lead agency
should manage the health, safety, environmental, and social impact review of the new
variety by consulting with other agencies where their expertise is necessary or
advantageous.
In fact, the agencies already have mechanisms in place to share information "as
necessary" and "when appropriate."" By designating one lead agency but giving the
agencies a mandate to consult with each other on issues that require technical expertise
possessed by another agency, new legislation would make inter-agency consultation
not only appropriate but recommended whenever an agency desires additional
information or opinion.
Inter-agency consultation is already familiar in other contexts. For example, the
Endangered Species Act requires any federal agency whose action might impact
endangered or threatened species to consult with either the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration-Fisheries.119 In
those consultations, the requesting agency forwards its own Biological Assessment to
FWS or NOAA-Fisheries. 120 FWS or NOAA-Fisheries reviews the data, conducts
additional research if necessary, and returns its Biological Opinion as to whether the

114 See 80 Fed. Reg. 73,104 (Nov. 24, 2015); see also Brady Dennis, The FDA JustApproved the
Nation 's FirstGeneticallyEngineeredAnimal: A Salmon that Grows Twice as Fast, WASH. POST, Nov.

19, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/11/19/the-fda-just-approvedthe-nations-first-genetically-engineered-animal-a-salmon-that-grows-twice-as-fast/.
115 Section 20l(g)(1)(C) of the FDCA defines "drugs" as "articles (other than food) intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals." 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(g)(1)(C).
116 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604; 40 C.F.R. §§ 720.1-.122 (2016).
117 For a discussion of the potential harms from gene drives, see NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., GENE
DRIVES ON THE HORIZON: ADVANCING SCIENCE, NAVIGATING UNCERTAINTY, AND ALIGNING RESEARCH

WITH PUBLIC VALUES 63-75 (2016).

118 See Update to Coordinated Framework, supra note 14, at 33.
119 See 16 U.S.C.
120 See 16 U.S.C.

§
§

1536(a)(2).
1536(a)(3).
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agency action may go forward (or may go forward with mitigating actions) without
threatening the species of concern. 12 1
A similar model could be employed for oversight of any new varieties of plants,
animals, microbes, or insects. For example, USDA has significant experience
reviewing the agro-environmental impacts of new plants produced through
recombinant DNA, but does not currently assess the human health impacts of
consuming food derived from such plants. FDA, however, already has significant
experience reviewing health impacts of such products. A limited number of key
personnel and resources from FDA about the health impacts of consuming food from
genetically-engineered plants could be housed within USDA, giving USDA sufficient
resources to make an initial health assessment of any plant it proposes to approve for
commercial release. Where these new personnel flag any potential unique or unknown
health impacts, USDA should submit its research to FDA for a Food Safety Opinion,
and USDA should be bound to follow FDA's recommendations with regard to
approval of the product.
This lead-agency approach would streamline the approval process for developers,
particularly smaller labs that do not have large offices devoted to shepherding the
product through several separate regulatory reviews, often at different times. By reassigning certain key personnel with critical experience to the lead agency, developers
will have the simplicity of dealing directly with only one regulator. In the case of new
plant varieties created using genetic engineering techniques that are well known, such
as recombinant DNA, the lead agency will often be able to approve the product without
inter-agency consultation. Where the risks of a new variety are uncertain, the lead
agency, not the developer, would have the responsibility to coordinate oversight with
other technical experts through the use of the consultation process. This process need
be no less rigorous than the voluntary pre-market safety reviews currently conducted
under the FDCA for new transgenic foods (and could indeed be made more so, as
discussed below in subsection C). Finally, by tying together all potential impacts of an
agency's approval decision-impacts on the agricultural environment, human or
animal health, secondary effects on the environment, and sociological impacts-this
process would facilitate more comprehensive consideration by the lead agency and
comment by concerned members of the public in a single proposal, comment, and
approval process.

C. Tying Oversight to Risk (Really)
Many of the biggest controversies in GMO regulation have related back to one
decision made by the Executive branch in the early days of biotechnology policy: that
federal agency oversight authority should be based on the product produced, not the
process used to produce it. 122 As a result of this decision, genetic engineering, as such,

121 See 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(b).
122 In a 1992 policy notice on the scope of exercise of federal oversight over biotechnology (Final
Statement on Scope), the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced the principle that "a
determination to exercise oversight within the scope of discretion afforded by statute should not turn on
the fact that an organism has been modified or modified by a process or technique, because such fact is
not alone a sufficient indication of risk." Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory
Authority: Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg. 6,753,
6,756 (Feb. 27, 1992) [hereinafter Final Statement on Scope]. Instead, the scope of oversight was to be
based on risk: "Organisms with new phenotypic trait(s) conferring no greater risk to the target
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has never been regulated in the United States. Instead, the U.S. regulatory system
purports to regulate new plant varieties, foods made from them, pesticides in plants,
and so forth, based on the risks presented by the particular product. 123
In theory, then, federal oversight over new plant and animal varieties is a risk-based
approach (providing oversight for new products based on their risk of harm) rather
than a process-based approach (providing oversight for any product made through
"genetic engineering," however defined). In fact, however, federal oversight has been
somewhere in between. By locating USDA's jurisdiction in the PPA, the Coordinated
Framework effectively triggered oversight only over new plant varieties that are or
may become plant pests-i.e., those that use Agrobacterium to deliver DNA to the
target organism. 124 This definition is neither process-based nor risk-based, but
category-based: federal oversight is triggered by any new plant varieties that have a
certain trait; i.e., they are or contain a plant pest. Similarly, EPA jurisdiction under
FIFRA, FDCA and TSCA is category-based, since EPA will exercise jurisdiction over
any microorganism or plant that has insecticidal properties, independent of the level
of novelty or risk of the product. 12 5 FDA's authority under the FDCA may also be
characterized as category-based, since that oversight is triggered by the presence of a
"food additive." 126
Using pre-existing statutes to regulate biotechnology has thus resulted in a
predominantly category-based approach that has failed to satisfy many consumer
concerns even over existing technology and will increasingly leave gaps in oversight
over technology that OSTP could not have foreseen in 1986. To coherently regulate
the next generation of genetically engineered products and gain public support for their
application, new legislation will have to develop a new schema for determining what
will trigger federal oversight.
The new class of technologies underscores the inherent flaws of a process-based
approach. Existing definitions of "genetic engineering" such as the one used in the
Vermont labeling statute would fail to capture new technologies such as CRISPR/Cas9
and RNAi. 127 Moreover, a process-based approach does not avoid thorny controversies

environment than the parental organisms should be subject to a level of oversight no greater than that
associated with the unmodified organisms." Id.
123 See supra Section I.A.
124

See 7 U.S.C.

§ 7702.

125 See Coordinated Framework, supranote 1; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Introductionto
Biotechnology Regulationfor Pesticides,https://www.epa.gov/regulation-biotechnology-under-tsca-and-

fifra/introduction-biotechnology-regulation-pesticides#overview.
126 By making the presumption that all genetically-engineered food ingredients are GRAS and
requiring only a voluntary consultation process, FDA has arguably outsourced the final determination of
risk (for products within the "food additive" category) to the developer. See FDA Statement of Policy,
supra note 48; see also note 62 (describing voluntary consultation process).
127 Act 120 defines "genetic engineering" as
a process by which a food is produced from an organism or organisms in which
the genetic material has been changed through the application of: (A) in vitro
nucleid acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
techniques and the direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles; or (B)
fusion of cells (including protoplast fusion) or hybridization techniques that
overcome natural physiological, reproductive, or recombination barriers, where
the donor cells or protoplasts do not fall within the same taxonomic group, in a
way that does not occur by natural multiplication or natural recombination.
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over the scope of regulation, since any attempt to craft a definition would have to
address up front questions such as whether cisgenesis (combining specific DNA from
sexually compatible species to better target breeding effects) should be regulated.
Passing new legislation using a truly product-based approach would accomplish
two goals that have been portrayed in the media as incompatible. First, it would avoid
singling out breeders who use modem laboratory techniques by focusing all new
varieties-whether produced through conventional breeding, rDNA techniques, or
modem techniques such as CRISPR/Cas9-and subjecting them to oversight
commensurate with the determined level of risk. At the same time, it would better
respond to consumer concerns that genetically-engineered products are evading
oversight by jettisoning the leaky category-based approach and requiring that all new
plant, animal, microbe, insect, or other varieties be classified by risk and regulated
according to that classification.
Canada follows a type of risk-based approach that may serve as a useful model. In
Canada, regulation is based on the novelty of the trait introduced, rather than the
process used to introduce the trait. 128 So far, all genetically-engineered crops have been
submitted for review (although some may soon not require submission). 12 9 The
Canadian food safety regulator "has acknowledged that in most cases products of
conventional plant breeding are unlikely to pose a risk to the enviromnent" and
therefore do not require regulatory review, but using risk as a trigger means that some
conventional plants may trigger review. 130 In Canada, product developers are
encouraged to consult with regulators early in the development process for advice on
whether the product is likely to be considered "novel," triggering regulation under that
system. 131 Even if a genetically-engineered organism is not considered novel because
the GE trait was previously approved, it must be accompanied by an environmental
stewardship plan to manage crop resistance development. 132
To implement a similarly risk-based approach in the United States, each agency
should be required to promulgate programmatic regulations specifying how the agency
will assess (at least) high-, moderate-, and low-risk classification for all new varieties
within its jurisdiction. Codex Alimentarius Commission has published international
standards for conducting food safety risk assessments based on recombinant-DNA
organisms and, to ensure that regulations satisfy the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, should inform agency risk rankings of new products. 133
Scientists are now developing better technologies for comparing changes in gene
sequencing in a target organism compared to a non-GE reference organism, and the

Act 120, VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 9,

§ 3042(4)

(2012) (enacted May 8, 2014).

128 See Food and Drug Regulations, B.28.001-B.28.003, C.R.C., c 870 (Can.) (defining and
establishing pre-market notification system for "novel foods").
129 See NAT'L ACAD. OF

SCIS., supranote 17, at 324.

130 Id.

131 Id. at 324.
132

See NAT'L ACA. OF SCIS., supra note 17, at 323.

133 See CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMM'N, FOODS DERIVED FROM MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY (2d ed.

2009) (includes Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modem Biotechnology, CAC/GL
44-2003; Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods Derived from RecombinantDNA Plants, CAC/GL 45-2003; Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety Assessment of Foods Derived
from Recombinant-DNA Micro-Organisms, CAC/GL 46-2003; Guideline for the Conduct of Food Safety
Assessment of Foods Derived from Recombinant-DNA Animals, CAC/GL 68-2008).
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effect of those changes at the RNA, protein, and metabolite levels. 134 Those
technologies (genomics, transcriptomics, metabolomics, and proteomics) as they
evolve will enable regulators to better assess the risks posed by different genetic
modifications and to articulate categories of products that are expected to pose high,
moderate, or low risk. For example, a new organism that shows a similar profile to an
existing species should pose low risk and be regulated accordingly.
APHIS has already begun considering a similar type of tiered risk assessment-based
trigger for regulation for exercising its authority under the Plant Protection Act. In its
notice of programmatic EIS for potential new regulations for approvals under the PPA,
one alternative proposed by APHIS was to "analyze potential plant pest and noxious
weed risks first; and then regulate only when appropriate and necessary." 135 APHIS
proposed to establish criteria that would indicate the potential to pose documented
plant pest or noxious weed risks and thus trigger regulatory review. 136 Those criteria
include "whether the recipient organism is a biocontrol organism, a microorganism
that has been modified for altered plant-microbe interactions, or a plant," and whether
the donor or vector organism is a known plant pest or is unknown or unclassified. 137
APHIS proposed to define certain classes of organisms that would be exempt from
regulation, such as products of biotechnology with modifications that could have been
obtained through traditional mutagenic techniques. 138
It is important for legislators and regulators to recognize that classification of risk
level for new products will not be an exact science. Although contemporary genome
sequencing techniques allow scientists to compare the genome of the modified
organism with a non-modified counterpart to find off-target effects of the
modification, 139 the current scanning mechanisms may overlook off-target effects in
unlikely places that the mechanism did not think to search.140 Even if that process is
perfected to allow scientists to identify all off-target effects, however, genome
sequencing is not designed to show how any intended or off-target DNA modifications
will be expressed by the organism under different circumstances, such as specific

134 See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supranote 17, at 252-63.

135 Environmental Impact Statement; Introduction of the Products of Biotechnology, 81 Fed. Reg.
6225, 6227 (Feb. 5, 2016).
136 Id
137 Id
138 Id
139 See Benjamin P. Kleinstiver et al., High-Fidelity CRISPR-Cas9Nucleases with No Detectable
Genome-Wide Off-Target Effects, 529 NATURE 490, 494 (2016) (nuclease demonstrated almost no off-

target effects when tested using algorithm that searches genome for such effects); see also Harvard, MGH
Team CreatesCRISPR/Cas9 Variant that Eliminates Off-Target Effects, GENOMEWEB (Jan. 6, 2016),

https://www.genomeweb.com/gene-silencinggene-editing/harvard-mgh-team-creates-crisprcas9-varianteliminates-target-effects [hereinafter Harvard,MGH Team Variant].
140 See Sharon Begley, Do CRJSPR EnthusiastsHave Their Head in the SandAbout the Safety of

Gene Editing?, STAT, July 18, 2016, https://www.statnews.com/2016/07/18/crispr-off-target-effects/;
Harvard,MGH Team Variant, supra note 138. The problem is that CRISPR works by spelling out a string
of nucleotides that it intends to edit on one chromosome, but other chromosomes may contain gene
sequences with the same string of nucleotides and CRISPR may cut the wrong one. Begley, supra. In
cases like the Harvard-Mass General study cited above, algorithms have identified up to a dozen "known"
off-target sites where CRISPR may have off-target effects, but there can be as many as 150 "novel" offtarget effects that the algorithms cannot detect.

2017

RE-FRAMING BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION

335

growing conditions.' Agency rules will have to require field testing to begin to assess
these variables and recognize that not all variables can be reproduced in testing. Since
classifications as low, moderate, and high risk will always involve some imprecision,
an inclusive, public debate to determine a socially accepted level of risk tolerance is
crucial to success of the new framework.
In addition to defining the means the agency will use to rank risk, regulations should
also provide means for public input. To achieve public buy-in and social license to
operate, it is critical that these regulations be promulgated through notice-andcomment rulemaking, rather than through the policy statements, interpretive rules, and
guidance documents often used under the Coordinated Framework. 14 2
D. Biosafety Clearinghouse
Given the unpredictability and complexity of technological change in biosciences,
no regulatory scheme can anticipate every new product or designate, ex ante, the
process that applicants and regulators will be required to follow to ensure adequate
and efficient oversight in every instance. To add cohesiveness and agility to federal
regulation of new products, Congress should create an office that will direct applicants
to the correct agency and coordinate inter-agency consultations. If oversight is more
closely linked to risk than under the Coordinated Framework, as described in Section
III.C. this office should have authority over all new plants, animals, microbes, insects,
biologics, or other products derived from genetic modification of any sort, including
conventional breeding techniques.
Terminology is important. By naming the office the "Biosafety Clearinghouse,"
Congress can focus both the public's and the regulators' attention on the risk-based
trigger for oversight, an important shift from the existing framework. Choosing the
term "biosafety" instead of "biotechnology," and the regulatory approach that choice
reflects, takes seriously consumer concerns that new products of genetic modification
-by both traditional and laboratory methods -be subject to independent regulatory
safety assessment. 14 3 The biosafety focus does not single out new methods of genetic
modification as especially risky, in keeping with the principle of the Final Statement
on Scope that the final product, not the process, should be the focus of oversight."4
But neither does the biosafety focus make the scientifically unsubstantiated
presumption that all products produced through biotechnology are safe.
The Biosafety Clearinghouse could serve three important functions. First, it would
conserve resources among the busy regulatory agencies by serving as a traffic cop-a
sort of biosafety version of the DMV intake desk-for applicants, industry groups,
members of the public, legislators, researchers, state governments, and any other
parties with varied requests for information about biosafety generally or product
approvals specifically.
Second, the Clearinghouse could serve as a resource for the regulators and the
public by monitoring and compiling information about approvals (both pending and

141 Harvard,MGH Team Variant, supra note 138.
142 See generally Alison Peck, Does Regulation Kill DemocraticDeliberation?The Case ofG
MOs,

46 CREIGHTON L. REv. 101 (2013) (highlighting deficit in public participation in creation of existing
regulatory apparatus and lack of buy-in by contemporary consumers).
143 See supra Section II.C.

144 See Final Statement on Scope, supra note 121, at 6,756.
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past), agency procedures, and inter-agency consultations. Regulators engaged in
consultations over a product with multiple functions or areas of risk could work with
the clearinghouse to exchange data and other information. The clearinghouse could
work to identify information that has been submitted as part of a public process and to
make that information available in accessible form to researchers, industry groups,
NGOs, foreign governments, and other members of the public who will be important
players in developing a more robust and balanced research base about new genetic
engineering techniques and products.'
Third, the Clearinghouse could take the lead in surveying the landscape of future
technologies and products that may require special regulatory attention or, more
importantly, legislative adjustments to the regulatory framework. In the 1980s, the
Reagan Administration formed a Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee
(BSCC) that was charged with this function of surveying the science and alerting
Congress of needed changes. 14 6 However, the BSCC was dissolved after its members
failed to reach agreement on the scope of organisms that would be subject to, and
exempt from, regulation.1 7 Although White House officials acknowledged that
surveying the technological landscape and alerting Congress to needed changes would
be crucial to success of the Coordinated Framework,' that function was never filled.
The Biosafety Clearinghouse could serve this role and prevent the proliferation of
jurisdictional gaps in the new regulatory approach that have plagued the Coordinated
Framework.
E. Comprehensive EnvironmentalMonitoringby EPA
One offshoot of the Coordinated Framework is that EPA, the agency with the
greatest expertise in environmental protection, does not exercise jurisdiction over
ensuring that most products of genetic engineering are safe for the environment.
Consistent with the category-based approach to federal oversight, EPA's jurisdiction
has focused primarily on reviewing new pesticidal plants under FIFRA and new
genetically-engineered microbes under TSCA. 14 9
Instead of EPA oversight, the most publicly visible examples of federal oversight
of environmental impacts of genetically-engineered plants and animals have come in
the form of USDA's implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act
145 See infra note 160, and accompanying text.
146 CHARTER OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY SCIENCE COORDINATING COMMITTEE, in STAFF OF H.
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, 99TH CONG., REPORT ON ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL
REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: FROM RESEARCH TO RELEASE 108, 110 (Appendix D) (Comm. Print

1986).
147 See Emily Marden, Risk andRegulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on GeneticallyModified Food

and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 739-40 (2003); see also Principles for Federal Oversight of
Biotechnology: Planned Introduction Into the Environment of Organisms with Modified Hereditary Traits,
55 Fed. Reg. 31,118, 31,119-20 [hereinafter Proposed Statement on Scope].
148 See Biotechnology Regulation: HearingBefore the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigationsof
9 8 th Cong. 38 (1984) (statement of Karen Darling, Deputy

the H. Comm. On Energy & Commerce,

Assistant Secretary, Marketing and Inspection Services, USDA) ("We are, however, constantly
reevaluating our regulatory position as the state of the art of biotechnology changes.. . . If processes or
products are shown to require additional measures, the USDA will amend its regulations or request
additional authority.").
149 Id. at 88 (statement of Dr. Frank E. Young, Commissioner, FDA) ("[I]f there was an identifiable
loophole" in FDA's statutory authority, "we must bring that to the attention of both the administration and
Congress.").
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(NEPA) in connection with its decision to deregulate a genetically-engineered seed. 1"
In most cases, federal oversight through NEPA of environmental impacts of
genetically-engineered plants has been minimal. Of the 123 products deregulated since
1995, APHIS has performed a complete Environmental Impact Statement in only six
cases,1 5 1 two of them court-ordered. 152 APHIS has not yet denied a petition for
deregulation based on its study of environmental impacts. 153
Studying, monitoring, mitigating, and controlling these environmental impacts
requires time and resources that exceed the scope of a time-pressured EA or EIS to
accompany a deregulation decision. Moreover, NEPA is not designed to be a tool for
comprehensive, ongoing evaluation of or adaptation to environmental changes
effected by a new technology or class of technologies; it is meant only to encourage
reasoned decision-making about environmental impacts of a particular agency action
and to allow public participation in the analysis.154
Better coordination between USDA and EPA might be a step in the right direction,
and the National Strategy outlines a few agency goals related to environmental
protection.1 5 5 Those goals, however, remain focused on product-specific approvals and

150 See, e.g., Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. 06-CV-0 1075 CRB (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007)
(ordering APHIS to prepare Environmental Impact Statement on deregulation of genetically-engineered
alfalfa); Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 734 F. Supp. 2d 948 (N.D. Ca. 2010) (ordering APHIS to
prepare EIS on deregulation of genetically-engineered sugar beets); see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010) (reversing court of appeals decision upholding injunction against
APHIS granting partial deregulation while APHIS prepared an EIS on the petition for full deregulation of
genetically-engineered alfalfa).
151 See ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., Biotechnology, https://www.aphis.usda.gov

/biotechnology/petitions table_pending.shtml (listing determinations of nonregulated status with
supporting documentation). Apart from those ordered by the courts, the petitions for which APHIS has
prepared a full EIS involved products engineered to withstand more toxic herbicides such as Dicamba and
2,4-D, which offer growers alternatives to glyphosate use. See id. (EIS prepared for Monsanto Dicamba
and Glufosinate-tolerant cotton Dow 2,4-D, glyphosate and glufosinate-tolerant soybean Monsanto
Dicamba-tolerant soybean; Dow 2,4-D and Glufosinate-tolerant soybean). But see id. (Monsanto Dicamba
and glufosinate resistant corn and Dow 2,4-D and Glufosinate-tolerant cotton deregulated based on EA).
152 See Geertson Seed Farms, slip op., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
153 In Geertson Seed Farms, the district court ordered APHIS to prepare an EIS for its decision to
deregulate transgenic alfalfa because APHIS's EA had included evidence that bees may cross-pollinate
alfalfa feeds as much as two miles apart, raising concerns about contamination of non-genetically
engineered alfalfa crops near any transgenic alfalfa farms. Geertson Seed Farms, slip op. at * 12. Although
APHIS eventually completed the EIS, it nevertheless determined that deregulation was the best
alternative. See Determination of Regulated Status of Alfalfa Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the
Herbicide Glyphosate; Record of Decision, 76 Fed. Reg. 5,780 (Feb. 2, 2011); Environmental Impact
Statements; Notice of Availability, 75 Fed. Reg. 80,807 (Dec. 23, 2010) (announcing availability of Final
EIS for glyphosate-tolerant alfalfa); ANIMAL & PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., GLYPHOSATETOLERANT ALFALFA EVENTS JI01 AND J163: REQUEST FOR NONREGULATED STATUS, FINAL

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (December 2010), https://www.regulations.gov

/document?D=APHIS-2007-0044-12532.
154

See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE NEPA: HAVING YOUR VOICE

HEARD 2 (2007), https://ceq.doe.gov/nepa/Citizens_Guide_DecO7.pdf.
155 For instance, the report notes that USDA is in the process of preparing a draft programmatic EIS
"that will evaluate a range of risk-based approaches to regulation that the Agency can take as it works to
update its biotechnology regulations." NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 78, at 16; see also Environmental

Impact Statement; Introduction of the Products of Biotechnology, 81 Fed. Reg. 6225 (Feb. 5, 2016)
(notice of intent to prepare programmatic environmental impact statement on changes to regulations
involving biotechnology imports, movement, and environmental releases). Even the most environmentally
protective alternative identified in APHIS's draft EIS, however, still by jurisdictional necessity focuses on
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related environmental impact studies, rather than a shift toward environmental
monitoring or research that would evaluate the collective or diffuse effects of
biotechnology products in the environment, such as farmers' weed-control decisions.
The current statutory jurisdiction is insufficient even if agency coordination were
improved and NEPA analyses were more robust. First, EPA's jurisdiction under
FIFRA extends only to pesticide and herbicide management; even if EPA and USDA
were to better coordinate deregulation decisions and herbicide control regulations,
EPA's FIFRA and TSCA jurisdiction fails to reach other potential environmental
problems such as transfer of genetically-engineered traits to wild plants. This silo
approach to regulation has been largely responsible for the proliferation of impacts
such as the agro-environmental and human and animal health effects of overuse of
glyphosate.156 Moreover, placing a significant amount of environmental decisionmaking in USDA is ill-advised because of USDA's multi-faceted mission: USDA is
charged with promoting U.S. agricultural industry and productivity at the same time
that it is obligated to ensure good management and conservation of natural
resources. 1 7 It makes sense to obligate USDA to work with farmers on resource
management since USDA policy inevitably effects natural resource use, but USDA
was not intended to be and should not become the country's environmental regulatory
agency.
In a new biotechnology statute, EPA should be directed to monitor the
comprehensive environmental effects of release of products of genetic engineering that
are flagged as moderate- or high-risk of causing environmental impacts, both here or

the impacts of a particular deregulation decision and fails to reach more comprehensive monitoring and
research activities. See Environmental Impact Statement; Introduction of the Products of Biotechnology,
81 Fed. Reg. at 6228 (expanding regulation to include noxious weed risk as well as plant pest risk as
triggering regulation). APHIS notes that this alternative would "enable APHIS to become, to the extent
permitted by its PPA authorities, an all-encompassing, wide-scale regulatory permitting authority" and to
consider practices such as crop exclusion zones and isolation distances that would contribute to
coexistence of biotech and non-biotech crops. Id.; see generally U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. ADVISORY COMM. ON
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 2 1 sT CENTURY AGRIC. (AC21), ENHANCING COEXISTENCE: A REPORT OF THE

AC21 TO THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 9-15 (Nov. 2012), http://www.usda.gov/documents

/ac2 _report-enhancing-coexistence.pdf. Similarly, with regard to gene drives, the NationalStrategy
states that the agencies are working to better coordinate their activities for regulation of geneticallyengineered mosquitos, but regulation will still focus on better alignment with the agencies' traditional,
category-based jurisdiction - for example, regulation by EPA under FIFRA when the product is claimed
to control population levels and by FDA under the FDCA when the product is claimed to prevent disease.
NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 78, at 16-17.

156 Health effects of farmers' glyphosate overuse result from consumption of greater number of
toxic residues on food and feed. The World Health Organization has classified glyphosate as a probable
carcinogen Kathryn C. Guyton et al., Carcinogenicityof Tetrachlorvinphos,Parathion,Malathion,

Diazinon, and Glyphosate, 16 LANCET ONCOLOGY 490, 491 (May 2015); Daniel Cressey, Widely Used
HerbicideLinked to Cancer, NATURE (March 24, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/widely-used-

herbicide-linked-to-cancer- 1.17181 (canvassing evidence behind WHO categorization of glyphosate as
probable carcinogen and industry reaction). Although glyphosate exposure has been called a "concern" by
scientists, additional research and biomonitoring as to toxicity and endocrine disruption under typical
exposure levels is needed. See John Peterson Myers et al., Concerns Over Use of Glyphosate-Based
Herbicides and Risks Associatedwith Exposures:A Consensus Statement, 15 ENVTL. HEALTH 19 (2016).

157 USDA's mission also includes promotion of other goals that may at times be in tension with
resource conservation best practices, such as ending hunger and improving health; ensuring food safety;
and improving the economy of rural communities. See USDA MissionAreas, http://www.usda.gov
/wps/portal/usda/usdamobile?navid=USDAMISSIONAREAS&navtype=RT&parentnav=CONTACT
US.
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in international trade."' Congress should also appropriate funds for independent
research and testing on any technologies with especially high levels of both urgency
and environmental risk.15 9
F. Federally-FundedResearch on Health, Safety, and
Developing-Economy Products
The National Academy of Science has acknowledged that research gaps exist on
the safety of genetically-engineered foods.160 Moreover, the objectivity of some
existing research has been called into question, either on the grounds that it was
conducted or supported by the biotech industry,161 or that it was produced by
researchers with ties to anti-GMO advocacy groups. 16 2 Federal funding of research in
key areas of biotech health and safety and environmental impacts could contribute not
only to the scope of knowledge in the field, but also to perceived legitimacy and public
(including industry) acceptance of research findings. To achieve maximum
independence and engender public confidence, Congress should appropriate funding
for FDA, EPA, and USDA themselves to conduct research on key areas of scientific
uncertainty, and to partner with academic institutions (with no ties to either pro- or
anti-biotech interests) to conduct more extensive or complex testing and data
collection. Key areas for research study should be updated periodically by the
Biosafety Clearinghouse, which should also house and distribute research results.
In addition, Congress should allocate funds to sponsor industry research and
development on products with the greatest potential to impact world hunger by
improving developing-country agriculture. As discussed in Section II.B.,
CRISPR/Cas9 will enable small developers to create potentially path-breaking
innovations in areas in which larger companies have not yet focused because of the
difficulties of gaining a sufficient return on investment. The United States, as a leader
in innovation, can help to improve world public perception of the biotech industry by
supporting the R&D and commercialization process for technologies in priority
humanitarian areas.163 Moreover, public support for R&D will help to offset costs that

158 See supra SectionI.lC.

159 See infra Section II.F.

160 See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 17, at 113-56 (canvassing human health concerns and
identifying data gaps).
161 See, e.g., Jose I. Domingo & Jordi Gine Bordonaba, A LiteratureReview on the Safety
Assessment of GeneticallyModified Plants, 37 ENV. INT'L 734, 734 (2011) ("[i]t should be noted that

most of these studies [concluding that GM plants are safe and nutritious] have been conducted by
biotechnology companies responsible [for] commercializing these GM plants."); see also Sheldon
Krimsky, An Illusory ConsensusBehind GMO HealthAssessment, 40 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 883,

906-08 (2015) (discussing studies of conflict of interest of researchers with ties to biotech industry).
162

See Krimsky, supra note 160, at 894-906 (discussing controversy surrounding two articles
finding health harms from genetically-engineered foods).
163 The Obama Administration's "Feed the Future" program includes an initiative led by USAID
and USDA "to strengthen international public goods research in ways that generate technologies and
knowledge that support agricultural productivity in both the U.S. and developing countries." See FEED THE
FUTURE, FEED THE FUTURE: GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY RESEARCH STRATEGY 6 (May 2011),

https://www.feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/FTFresearch strategy.pdf, see also id. at
40-41. Progress reports on the program highlight a couple of genetic engineering initiatives. See FEED THE
FUTURE, 2015 RESULTS SUMMARY ACHIEVING IMPACT: LEADERSHIP AND PARTNERSHIP TO FEED THE

FUTURE 16-17 (2015) (describing wheat genome sequencing to combat wheat stem rust pathogen and
research to combat aflatoxin through genetic resistance in maize and RNA interference approaches in
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lead products to get mired in intellectual property rights and technology transfer issues
that have plagued previous innovations like Golden Rice. 164
CONCLUSION
Political prospects for legislative reform in the coming year depend on several
factors. First, consumer awareness and political pressure behind the issue will likely
depend on USDA's implementation of the GMO labeling law, and of consumer
reaction to it. The public, unfortunately, has tended to focus attention on the question
of labeling, and the new law requiring some form of labeling may satisfy the majority
of consumers that the issue is resolved and decrease political momentum for a new
regulatory oversight regime.
Even if the labeling law mollifies some, however, the issue is not likely to disappear.
The potentially revolutionary ramifications of CRISPR/Cas9 and other new
technologies will soon refocus public attention on the question of the proper controls
on biotechnology. It is likely that environmental and food safety review will be less
precautionary under the Trump Administration and a Republican Congress than during
the Obama Administration. But renegotiation of the biotechnology statutory
framework to streamline regulatory burdens on small biotech businesses may gain
political traction. The reform proposed by this Article seeks to accomplish both the
goals of reducing regulatory red tape for well-established technologies and of
increasing oversight and public participation over higher-risk innovations.

peanuts), https://www.feedthefuture.gov/sites/default/files/resource/files/FeedtheFutureResults_
Summary Progress_2015.pdf.
164 See Ingo Potrykus, Golden Rice and Beyond, 125 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1157 (2001) (describing

difficulty of obtaining IP rights to more than 70 intellectual and technical property rights belonging to 32
different companies and universities used in developing transgenic rice with additional Vitamin A).

